Limitation of Liability--Unjustly Applied to Pleasure Craft by Nelder, Wendy Ellen
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 13 | Issue 2 Article 7
1-1961
Limitation of Liability--Unjustly Applied to
Pleasure Craft
Wendy Ellen Nelder
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Wendy Ellen Nelder, Limitation of Liability--Unjustly Applied to Pleasure Craft, 13 Hastings L.J. 229 (1961).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol13/iss2/7
COMMENTS
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY -
Unjustly Applied to Pleasure Craft
By WENDY ELEN NE DaR*
M ORE THAN seven million pleasure craft-driven, for the most
part, by persons with little mechanical ability and even less knowledge
of the sea, its traditions, and its hazards'-presently fill the waters of
the United States. 2 The law has not kept pace with the rapid growth of
this industry. An antiquated law3 deprives the injured of the right to
sue for just compensation.
Carelessness Results in Mayhem
In California, under the Boating Law of 1959,4 registration of pleas-
ure craft is accomplished by application on an appropriate form, and
payment of a five-dollar fee for a three-year period. In most other
states, this is done under the federal regulations promulgated by the
Coast Guard.5
Thus, the boats themselves are regulated, but there is a definite
failure on the part of the government to regulate those who drive them.
Nowhere are the drivers of these boats required to be licensed; no-
where is the driver's knowledge of the boat and its capacities tested;
nowhere is the driver's age or mental capacity or sight essayed. Con-
sequently we have many drivers who are not capable of manipulating
these maiming, and sometimes lethal, weapons.
Mayhem, as defined by the California Penal Code, has taken place,
... if the injury inflicted deprives the person injured of a member of
his body or the usual uses of the severed organ."6
This impersonal statement of the law is a frightening description
of what too often happens at the hands of boaters who are careless or
incapable. For example, in Buehler v. Hilton' a motorboat pulling a
water skier made a sharp turn and a young woman fell out of the craft.
As she was struck by the propeller, an arm and leg, were severed. In
0 Member, Second Year class.
1 Wnmr, MAnuE INSuRANCE 301 (3d ed. 1952).
2 Yachting, January 1958, p. 115.
3 9 Stat. 635 (1851), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (1952).
'14 CAL. ADm. CODE §§ 5000-6696.
5 DrmsoN OF SmALL CRAFT Hawons, DEr"'r OF NATuRAL RESouRCES (Calif.),
ABC's OF CALwoRNA BOATING LAW 5 (1961).
3 CAL. PEN. CODE § 203.
7 Buehler v. Hilton, No. 77081, Sup. Ct., San Bernardino Co., CaL., Oct. 13, 1953.
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the ensuing trial, she was awarded 256,000 dollars; but this can hardly
compensate a young woman for going through the rest of her life with
only one arm, one leg. In the case of Wittsche v. Davis,8 similarly, a
small girl was run over by a driver who was drunk. At fourteen, this
child was condemned to go through life with no legs. Her 160,000
dollar settlement cannot pay for that, although it will begin to pay
the bills.
As Dean Pound has expressed it, carelessness becomes a more fre-
quent and more serious threat to the general security than aggression.0
Who Should Pay?
In the past decade there have been some one hundred cases in the
United States involving motorboats. 10 The suffering, pain, and humil-
iation that follow these injuries should be compensated for. Hospital
bills, funeral expenses, bills for artificial limbs empty someone's pockets.
But whose pockets?
Surely, it is only equitable that he who is to blame should pay. And
still, such compensation is patently inadequate, for as was succinctly
stated to one jury, "Would you [pick up one hundred brand new thou-
sand-dollar bills and put them in your pocket] ... if you knew that, in
return, you'd have to submit to having a leg . . . torn off-that when
you were well again you would have to look forward, for the rest of
your natural life, to wearing [an artificial limb] every day?""
Though the award may be inadequate relative to the injured party,
the payment thereof would nevertheless be far beyond the means of
most persons; and few persons can afford to risk the possibility of hav-
ing to pay such an award. Thus, insurance is provided to cover such
liability.
Marine Insurance
Generally speaking, in California, marine insurance covers loss or
damage to persons or property in connection with a marine, or loss or
damage arising out of its construction, repair, or maintenance.' 2
Unless California Insurance Code section 533-which states that a
wilful act of the assured causing the loss sought to be recovered for
negates liability-or the illegal purpose exclusion clause found in most
policies applies, the insurer assumes liability for all losses proximately
caused by the perils insured against, and traditionally, these are the
perils of the sea.1 3 A policy for marine insurance has been spoken of as
an absolute contract to indemnify for loss from such perils. 14
8 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1949).
9 21 NACCA L.J. 375 (1958).
10 CCH release, July 26, 1960.
11 BELLI, READY FOR THE PLAINTIFF! 52 (2d ed. 1957).
12 CAL. INS. CODE § 103(b).
132 8 CAL. Jun. 2d Insurance § 456 (1956).
14 Tyson v. Union Ins. Soc., 8 F.2d 356 (N.D. Cal. 1924).
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Perils of the sea, as defined by the California Harbor and Navigation
Code are storms and waves; rocks, shoals, and rapids; other obstacles
though of human origin; changes of climate; confinement necessary at
sea; animals peculiar to the sea; and all other dangers peculiar to the
sea.15
The Small Craft
Since small craft is presently developing into a unique problem and
specifically applicable laws have been enacted, specific coverage has
been provided. Most homeowner or Comprehensive Personal Liability
policies cover liability for bodily injury or property damage, medical
payments to the injured whether the policy holder is liable or not, and
all costs of defending suits whether the policy holder is liable or not,
on boats which use outboards of less than ten horsepower. 16
A type of hull insurance, however, called Yacht insurance, which
insures all types of pleasure craft, whether their motive power is sail
or mechanical device, is the most popular form of coverage for pleasure
craft.17 This type of policy is divided into three parts: 1) hull insurance
which covers the boat itself, both while navigating and during the
'out-of-season lay-up; 2) a coverage similar to the protection and indem-
nity insurance, which covers liability for loss of life, personal injury
and property damage, and workmen's compensation; and 3) medical
payments.' 8
These yacht policies, along with "all cases of damage or injury, to
person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwith-
standing that such damage or injury be done or consummated on
land,""'9 are subject to marine law and interpretation.
Federal Jurisdiction: Application of Federal Statute
The United States Constitution gives the federal judiciary jurisdic-
tion over all admiralty and maritime cases.20 Therefore, federal regu-
lations may be imposed in these cases where a maritime nature is
evident. Consequently, although no amount of money can fully com-
pensate for the loss of a limb, and although any amount awarded will
be relatively minute, the insurers may call for the application of a
unique federal rule to lower the liability of the insured, and their own
liability, yet more.
15 CAL. HArm. & N. CoDE § 422. Collision is also a peril, on the theory of proximate
cause, so long as wind or waves are involved, Peters v. Warren Ins. Co., 13 U.S. (14
Pet.) 370 (1840); accidental striking of a foreign object such as ice is also included,
Newton Creek Towing Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 163 N.Y. 114, 23 App. Div. 152 (1900).
'6Tnz RouGH NoTms Co., INc., Boat Ins.-1321.2, Chart a Course of Protection 4
(1960).
17 WnqTER, op. cit. supra note 1 at 300.
is Id.
1946 U.S.C. §740 (1958).
20 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
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In 1851, the United States adopted a "Limitation of Liability" stat-
ute.2 1 It states that the liability of the owner of a boat for an act done
without his privity or knowledge shall not exceed the value of the
interest of said owner in said vessel and freight then pending.
Procedural Development
For twenty years after its enactment, the statute was seldom ap-
plied.22 Then in Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright,23 the require-
ments for its operation were established. Among other provisions, it
was construed to include collisions as well as injuries to cargo, and it
was provided that when limitation was granted, if the vessel and its
freight (though in such a state as to be of diminished value) were
handed over to a trustee for the benefit of the suing parties, the owner
would be discharged; and it was stated that if they were totally lost,
the owner would be discharged of further liability.
The case further established that the district court sitting as a court
of admiralty would have jurisdiction of these cases. More specifically,
the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of this special proceeding,
but this does not remove the case from the state court. It merely stays
proceedings in the state court. The federal court may, however, com-
pletely dispose of all claims for damages if it denies the owner's right
to limitation.2 4 This is left to the court's discretion.
After this case, the statute was frequently applied, and it was nearly
impossible to show the shipowner to have privity and knowledge. A
typical case is The Petition of Liebler2 5 A swimmer was thrown from
a speeding motorboat and was killed. The owner's husband was driv-
ing, in the owner's presence. The negligence of the husband and the
speed with which he drove were determined to be the cause of death.
Limitation was granted, however, the court stating that though the
owner was present, she had no knowledge of the operation since the
husband was experienced in driving, and took no directions from her.
The key problems with this statute seem to be in the definitions of
the phrase "privity and knowledge." In Liebler, privity was defined
as "some fault or neglect in which the owner of the vessel personally
participates"; knowledge was held to be "some personal cognizance
or means of knowledge of which the owner is bound to avail himself."
Privity and knowledge turn on the facts of the particular case. 26
Insurance Proceeds in Limitation
The purpose of a limitation proceeding is to provide, in an equitable
fashion, a marshalling of assets. 27 One question which has long occu-
21 9 Stat. 635 (1851), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (1952).
22 27 INS. COUNSEL J. 62 (1960).
23 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871).
2445 CAL. Jum. 2d Shipping § 11 (1958).
25 19 F. Supp. 829 (W.D.N.Y. 1937).
26 Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1942).
27 Petition of Texas Co., 213 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1954).
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pied the courts, is the following: Do these assets include the proceeds
of insurance?
There are a very few states, of which California is one, which per-
sist in construing procedural rules very liberally.28 But even these states
have found no answer, up to the present time, for this question.
In Place v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co.,29 in 1886, the Supreme
Court held that a shipowner should be able to contract with his in-
surance company for indemnity against loss of his investment. Pos-
sibly stemming from this decision, it was held for many years that the
liability insurance of the shipowner was not available for payment of
claims beyond the amount of the limitation fund, if limitation was
granted. The answer to this question seemed to be clearly a negative
one. And up until 1954, there was little room for speculation.
Then in 1954, in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing,30 direct action
against liability insurers by injured claimants was allowed. Of the sit-
uation, Mr. Justice Black said, "Liability insurance is not bought to
guarantee reimbursement for loss of a shipowner's property. Its pur-
pose is to pay for damage done to others by the shipowner or his
agents... ."1 Public policy holds that liability insurance exists for the
protection of the injured, as well as the insured. The decision in this
case, however, was not explicit, since four members of the court favored
the direct action, four wanted to deny it, and one favored a policy of
wait and see. The single justice wanted to be sure the federal limitation
proceeding would not be interfered with. This decision did, however,
weaken the previously unshaken theory of The City of Norwich.
The Limitation of Liability statute was held to include pleasure
craft within its scope in Feige v. Hurley;32 and in The Alola83 it was
stated that a motorboat is a vessel within the meaning of the statute.
Hence, this statute, enacted solely for commercial reasons, now works
to the detriment of the injured plaintiff in many pleasure craft cases.
Avoidance of Application
Recently, however, application of this statute has frequently been
avoided. The theory now proceeded on is straight negligence.
One of the many techniques used to fix liability is the use of a
safety regulation with a criminal penalty attached to either suggest or
to mandate the answer to the question, "was the defendant negli-
gent?"34 There is, for example, the Federal Boating Act of 1958,35 the
2s28 Forw4m L. Rv. 215 (1959).
29 118 U.S. 468 (1886).
30347 U.S. 409 (1954).
31Id. at 434 (dissent).
32 89 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1937).
s 228 Fed. 1006 (E.D.Va. 1915).
34 Foust, The Use of Criminal Law as a Standard of Civil Responsibility in Indiana,
35 U.S. LJ  45 (1959).35 46 U.s.c. §§ 527(a)-(h) (1958).
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preamble of which states that it is to promote boating safety on the
navigable waters of the United States, her territories, and the District
of Columbia. The body of the act states that "no person shall operate
any motorboat or any vessel in a reckless or negligent manner so as to
endanger the life, limb, or property of any person,"36 and if this should
be violated, the violater may be fined up to 2,000 dollars, be imprisoned
for up to one year, or both. In the case of Davis v. United States, 37, the
defendant was held guilty under this section and fined 1500 dollars and
sentenced to six months imprisonment.
If the statute violated specifically provides for civil recovery by the
injured party, liability follows breach as a matter of law. If civil re-
covery is not specified, however, breach of a criminal law enacted pri-
marily to protect a class of people of which plaintiff is a member, and
to prevent the very type of injury which has occurred, is followed by
recovery through use of this violation in the civil litigation to establish
a breach of the standard of care legally provided.3
In Rothman v. U-Steer-It, 39 the plaintiffs rented a boat which ex-
ploded while they were riding in it. The boat was shown to be unsea-
worthy, but had plaintiffs tried to recover on the admiralty doctrine of
unseaworthiness, a species of liability without fault, which means a
dangerous condition of which the owner has no knowledge or notice,40
the defendant would have been entitled to limitation. 41 If limitation
were granted, recovery could have been of no greater amount than the
twenty-five dollar value of the boat. This result was circumvented by
proceeding on a straight negligence theory. To prove knowledge and
notice, a double-charge was established: 42 the plaintiffs' experts showed
how the deterioration of the motor could have been prevented. By ex-
plaining the process of prevention, and showing there should have
been an attempt at it, the plaintiffs showed constructive knowledge of
the defect if preventive measures were taken, or actual notice by be-
ing the creator if they were not taken. Consequently, full recovery
was allowed.
Conclusion
The effect, then, of this antiquated statute is obvious. Though it
was not designed to grant immunity, but only to limit liability, rela-
tively speaking, it does so anyway. The injured swimmer, skier or
seaman who receives a paltry sum, in the face of what he loses, might
as well be granted a package of "Lifesavers" to ease his suffering.
3646 U.S.C. § 526(1) (1958).
37 185 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1950).
38 35 IND. L.J. 45 (1959).
39 247 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1957).
40 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
41 RAssNER, Motorboat Explosion; Use of Experts in Reconstruction of the Facts, in
BELLI SEmINAR 556, 558 (1959).
42 Id. at 560.
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As was expressed by Mr. Justice Black in the Maryland Cas. Co.
case, Limitation of Liability wasn't enacted to encourage investment
in insurance companies by limiting their liabilities.4"
Black further stated that the commercial reasons for the statute
have passed. Today if shipping is to be aided it is done by subsidies
out of the public treasury, not at the expense of the injured. 44
The present trend is toward more narrow construction of the Lim-
itation of Liability statute. It has been suggested that a double stand-
ard might be called for; that cases involving large vessels might call for
application of the statute, and cases involving pleasure craft should be
strictly dealt with. This attitude is too liberal. The statute is outmoded,
even as applied to large vessels. It should be repealed for the sake
of justice.
43 347 U.S. 409, 433 (dissent).
44 Id. at 437 (dissent).
